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Strange phenomena drive a lot of otherwise surprising features of system-
atic theories, phenomena that buck the usual cases and demand an explana-
tion that goes beyond the obvious norm. This is so not only in philosophy
but in all cases of systematic truth-seeking theorizing, from science to theol-
ogy. For present purposes, let truth-theoretic paradoxes (e.g., liars, etc.) be
our paradigm of strange phenomena. In the face of such phenomena many
have advanced an account according to which logic is nonclassical. Against
such accounts W.V.O. Quine [36] famously argued from a principle of con-
servatism (viz., minimal mutilation of current theory) and the premise that
classical logic is the status quo to the conclusion that, because nonclassical
logic appears to reduce (or at least not increase) explanatory power of many
true theories (e.g., maths, physics, more), one should reject nonclassical-logic
responses to strange phenomena. All of this (and more) is familiar.
Also familiar is that Quine’s argument, despite the valuable pragmatist
methodology that drives it, is often seen to plainly fail as an argument against
nonclassical-logic accounts of strange phenomena. Perhaps the biggest reason
for the failure, setting aside his unfortunate charge of ‘changing the subject’,
is that Quine’s argument precludes nonclassical logic from the get-go – the
central premise claiming both that classical logic is the ‘status quo’ and
that conservatism in our methodology requires us to maintain the status quo
(short of some resoundingly loud recalcitrant data that leaves no other option
but to dive to the deeper depths of subclassical or otherwise nonclassical
logic). In short, Quine’s argument simply doesn’t touch target nonclassical
accounts since it locks them outside from the start.
Can one do better by way of the Quinean argument? Timothy Williamson
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[47] aims to do just that: he presents a new Quinean argument based again
on central ingredients of common pragmatism about theory choice (includ-
ing logical theory, as is common). What makes it new is that, in addi-
tion to avoiding Quine’s unfortunate charge of mere terminological squabble,
Williamson’s argument explicitly rejects – at least for purposes of the argu-
ment – Quine’s key conservatism premise.1
In this paper I do two things. First, I argue that Williamson’s new
Quinean argument implicitly relies on Quine’s conservatism principle. Sec-
ond, by way of answering his charges against nonclassical logic I directly
defend a particular subclassical account of logical consequence.
The structure of the paper: §1 does some (alas, lengthy) stage-setting
work (clarifying terminology and background assumptions); §2 presents the
main point that Williamson’s new argument fails to bear against the target
nonclassical-logic account. §3–§4 briefly illustrate how a subclassical-logic
account – our representative nonclassical target of Williamson’s argument –
answers Williamson’s objections around ‘explanatory loss’.
1 What is logic?
The term ‘logic’ is used for many things. This is uncontroversial. Also un-
controversial (at least these days) is that logic, in a traditionally central sense
of the term, is about what follows from what.2 Furthermore, and mostly un-
1Williamson nonetheless endorses the premise that classical logic is the status quo, a
premise that I reject if we’re clear about which relation we’re tagging as ‘logical conse-
quence’. I return to this below.
I note that Williamson’s argument avoids Quine’s unfortunate subject-change charge
by explicitly not treating debates over logical consequence as mere verbal disputes or
generally metalinguistic. (And on this I fully agree with Williamson over Quine, and so
for space reasons say no more of it here – except to flag that Ole Hjortland [25] argues that
such debates need to be at least somewhat metalinguistic if our aim is to accommodate
a plurality of consequence relations that are beyond those that Williamson discusses.
Hjortland’s work contributes a new avenue for accommodating non-closure-operator – and
slightly metalinguistic – accounts. Because my own interest here, as discussed below, takes
the role of logical consequence to be a particular closure relation standardly understood,
I set Hjortland’s broader account aside here.)
2Quine’s focus on logical truths, at least as he intended it, assumed a particular de-
duction theorem. We have the influence of Belnap [14] and Anderson–Belnap [1] for
rightly emphasizing that not all theories of logical consequence have a deduction theorem
in Quine’s assumed sense. (Stephen Read [37] also makes the matter clear, as do Beall
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controversial among active philosophers of logic, is that the pragmatists (e.g.,
Harman, Putnam, Quine and many others) are more or less right, at least in
spirit, about the epistemic status of logic: there’s nothing epistemically – or,
for that matter, metaphysically, politically, theologically – special about the
given discipline of logic; there’s nothing epistemically (metaphysically, etc.)
‘exceptional’, to use Williamson’s preferred terminology. Logical theory is
theory, just as theology is theory, just as metaphysics is theory, and so on.
This attitude, these days, remains the norm among those theorists advancing
nonclassical-logic accounts of paradoxes, just as it remains the norms among
their classical-logic neighbors.
On the other hand, there is no point in ‘debating’ whether logic is non-
classical without an account of what the role of the relation – namely, logical
consequence – is supposed to be. Nobody rejects that in mathematics any
relation looking enough like ‘a logic’ can be studied ‘as logic’, and that we
should evaluate research projects in logic along standard pragmatic method-
ology.3 But nobody is debating any of that.
The debate between classical-logic and nonclassical-logic accounts of
strange phenomena (for present purposes, truth-theoretic paradoxes) requires
a stand on the role of the relation – namely, ‘logical consequence’ – at issue.
Exactly which role is at issue in all such debates is well beyond the scope
(and interest) of this paper. For present purposes I take a stand on the given
role that is compatible with Williamson’s new Quinean argument: I treat
logical consequence as one among (very) many formal entailment relations,
and in particular as a closure relation on theories, where ‘closure’ requires its
usual properties – properties reflecting the standard ‘reflexivity’, ‘monotonic-
ity’ and ‘transitivity’ of logical consequence (herein understood).4 To be a
& Restall [12] and many, many others since.) But I flag this point just to set it aside.
Williamson doesn’t rehearse the territory (no reference to Anderson or Belnap) but he
explicitly takes account of it.
3And, of course, much else goes into logic qua (roughly four-fold) mathematical disci-
pline, and similarly (though more narrowly) within philosophical logic (qua philosophical-
cum-mathematical discipline outside of mathematics). Beall & Burgess [11] provide a
concise summary of the terrain of contemporary logic.
4More clearly: I assume – with Williamson – that the consequence relations satisfy
their standard properties of reflexivity, monotonicity and transitivity in such a way that
the resulting closure operator or consequence operator on theories has its usual closure
properties – extensiveness, increasingness, and transitivity (in the usual way). This rules
out a lot of candidates for logical consequence, but my focus here is on Williamson’s
discussion – and he rules them out too.
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closure relation (on a theory) is to be a relation that, in addition to having
standard closure properties (above), ‘completes’ the theory by churning out
all of the consequences of the theory – consequences according to the given
closure relation. To be a formal closure relation, for present purposes, is to
do such completion work in terms of ‘forms’, where the relevant ‘forms’ are
individuated by select vocabulary in very familiar ways.
But none of that specifies logical consequence. There are many, many,
many entailment relations that are closure relations. Debates whether logical
consequence is nonclassical presuppose a prior answer: which of the many
closure relations is logical consequence? The answer points to logical vocab-
ulary in terms of which logical forms are defined.
1.1 Logical vocabulary as familiar De Morgan
Here, I have no new arguments to specify the exact features of logical vo-
cabulary. As a result, I have no new arguments for the claim that I assume
for present purposes: namely, that logical consequence is the closure relation
whose forms are individuated by the standard first-order vocabulary (shy
of identity).5 Still, I join the many in taking the standard batch of logi-
cal vocabulary to be ‘universal’ and ‘topic-neutral’ in a sense waved at by
Williamson, when he notes (in a different context) that
[A]ny complex scientific theory, especially one that involves some
mathematics, will make heavy use of negation, conjunction, dis-
junction, the quantifiers, and identity. [47, p.340]
And that’s correct. In what follows, I take logical vocabulary to be involved
in all of our true (closed) theories – our as-complete-as-possible true theories.
I should also note that one need not think that entailment requires heavy-duty truth,
heavy-duty necessity or so on. As today’s philosophical proof theorists will attest there
are many proof-theoretic ‘descriptions’ of entailment relations. I don’t intend to take sides
on that issue any more than Williamson’s discussion does, and Williamson’s discussion
intends not to take sides on the issue at all. (This isn’t to say that I don’t rule out certain
candidate relations in what I say (I absolutely do, as above); it’s just that taking them to
be entailment relations isn’t supposed to rule them out due to issues of weighty notions
of ‘truth preservation’, ‘necessity’ or so on.)
5Williamson treats identity as being in the standard bag of logical vocabulary, but
this item has been a controversial ingredient, and in any event is unnecessary for present
purposes. (My view is that identity relations are always theory-specific, but I set these
wider debates aside.)
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Except for identity, which I take to be a theory-specific issue of individuation
(among other things), Williamson’s standard bag of vocabulary is what I
assume to be logical vocabulary – the vocabulary in terms of which the logical
forms (i.e., the ‘forms’ recognized by logical consequence) are given.6
Just to be explicit, the standard logical vocabulary (herein, the logical
vocabulary) consists of a pair of unary connectives, a pair of binary connec-
tives, and two quantifiers – all pairs interpreted to contain ‘duals’ of each
other, namely:
• The (redundant) truth operator: it is true that....7
• The falsity operator (negation): it is false that....
• Conjunction: ...and....8
• Disjunction: ...or....
• Universal quantifier: Every object is such that....
• Existential quantifier: At least one object is such that....
Demanding that these pairs of connectives contain duals is a demand on their
behaviour (with respect to the consequence relation). And that’s generally
where rival theories of logical consequence differ. For my purposes in this
6Obviously, the term ‘logical form’, like the term ‘logical constants’, is often used to
pick out any specification of vocabulary used to define ‘forms’ for the (formal) consequence
relation. This is fine as far as terminological choices go. But if our concern is whether we
should reject nonclassical-logic positions we should first settle on the role of the relation –
namely, closure – and its details (i.e., which vocabulary defines the forms, etc.). That’s
all I’m sketching here. For recent debate on both logical vocabulary and its relation to
logical form see Gil Sagi’s work [42]; Sagi’s work challenges some of the assumptions of
this paper but, for purposes of the current paper (but only for such purposes), I set the
challenges aside.
7This is logically redundant – it is always treated as the null operator, taking a sentence
and delivering a logically equivalent (and everywhere intersubstitutable) sentence – and,
so, standardly left off the list. I mention it here only to complete the symmetric picture
of duals.
8This is sometimes useful to express using the truth operator, just to distinguish from
tense-intensive conjunctions (e.g., ‘dynamic’ conjunctions). One can think of the target
(logical) conjunction as It is true that...and it is true that....
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paper I treat the connectives as duals in the usual – and very traditional –
De Morgan sense, where the falsity operator (viz., negation) takes the dual
of a sentence to its dual (of duals, etc.): ¬ takes A ∧ B to ¬A ∨ ¬B; and ¬
takes A ∨B takes to ¬A ∧ ¬B; and ¬ takes ¬A to A; and so on.
On this approach to logical vocabulary (including its behaviour) many
rival theories of logic (-al consequence) are ruled out. I am in no way offering
a stand-alone argument for this approach; I am simply putting it on the table
as a concrete example of one ‘live’ and familiar theory of logical consequence
that is very much at stake in Williamson’s new Quinean argument against
nonclassical logic.
1.2 Classical and subclassical
To focus discussion let us zero in on exactly two candidate accounts of logical
consequence (so understood so far): namely, classical and FDE (reviewed
below).9 What is important to note is that both the classical account (viz.,
classical logic) and the subclassical account (viz., FDE) completely agree on
three things:
1. Logical Vocabulary: the vocabulary is the standard trinity of pairs
(viz., the two unary, two binary, and two quantifiers).
2. ‘Interpretation’ of Vocabulary: each pair contains duals (as in §1.1 and
sketched below).
3. Consequence is a Closure Relation (standardly understood).
Both candidates – the classical and given subclassical – can enjoy similar
‘semantics’. (This is not to privilege ‘semantics’ or model theory over proof
theory; it’s just that presentation of the former is vastly easier than the
9‘FDE’, for ‘first-degree entailment’, has come to be the tag for the target logic, of
which other well-known subclassical logics – for example, LP [3, 32] and K3 [27] and S3
[1, 2, 20] – are proper extensions, and of which classical logic is the ‘top’ extension. (S3, so
called by Field for ‘symmetric 3’ [20], is what you get if you add a rule to FDE according
to which every formal contradiction p ∧ ¬p entails – as a consequence – every instance
of the dual form ¬q ∨ q. (Adding double-negation equivalence to what Urquhart [44, 45]
labeled ‘Ockham logic’ results in FDE.)) All such common candidates agree on logic’s
heart: namely, De Morgan behaviour. I note that there’s a narrower (and original) use of
‘FDE’ by some relevance (aka ‘relevant’) logicians [17, 28, 31, 37], but the broader usage is
fairly standard [13, 34]. FDE was prominently studied by Belnap [15] and Dunn [18, 19].
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latter in non-specialist settings.) In particular, we can think of the semantics
along the lines of Dunn [18], using very familiar true-in-M and false-in-M
relations:10
• Atoms:11
◦ Exhaustion: either M |=t p or M |=f p, for every model M and
every atom p.
◦ Exclusion: either M 6|=t p or M 6|=f p, for every model M and
every atom p.
• Truth/null operator (†), for any model M and sentence A:
◦ M |=t †A iff M |=t A.
◦ M |=f †A iff M |=f A.
• Falsity/negation operator (¬), for any model M and sentence A:
◦ M |=t ¬A iff M |=f A.
◦ M |=f ¬A iff M |=t A.
• Conjunction (∧), for any model M and sentences A, B:
◦ M |=t A ∧B iff M |=t A and M |=t B.
◦ M |=f A ∧B iff M |=f A or M |=f B.
• Disjunction (∨), for any model M and sentences A, B:
◦ M |=t A ∨B iff M |=t A or M |=t B.
◦ M |=f A ∨B iff M |=f A and M |=f B.
10Here, I ignore the quantifiers and object variables not because they’re unimportant or
particularly difficult; I ignore them because their treatment is mirrored by the treatment
of conjunction and disjunction, and there is nothing special about Williamson’s argument
that turns on the quantifiers versus the simpler propositional level. Note that Dunn
famously pointed to a simple many-valued semantics wherein one takes the set of semantic
values to be the powerset ℘({t, f}) of the usual classical set {t, f}, taking every t-containing
value to be designated – ‘preserved’ in validity.
11In what follows I don’t specify how models ‘make true’ or ‘make false’ atoms, but the
story is the absolutely standard one in terms of (anti-) extensions and denotation. (Also,
notation-wise, M 6|=i is the negation of the given truth-/falsity-in-M relation.)
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And logical consequence is then defined as usual: a set X logically entails a
sentence A iff every model M that ‘makes true’ everything in X (i.e., M |=t B
for all B ∈ X) is one that likewise makes A true.
Note that if both exhaustion and exclusion are imposed then logical con-
sequence is exactly as classical-logic theorists say: namely, classical logic. If
neither exhaustion nor exclusion is imposed then logical consequence is ex-
actly as FDE theorists say: namely, FDE. In the latter case, there are no
logical truths (i.e., sentences that are true in all ‘possibilities’ – all models –
recognized by logical consequence), but all De Morgan interaction remains.
In the former (classical-logic) case, all De Morgan interaction remains, but
there are the usual (classical-logic) stock of logical truths.
For present purposes we focus on these two candidates alone: classical and
FDE. But worth noting is that commonly cited subclassical candidates LP
and K3 – both of which are explicitly highlighted by Williamson – differ on
the two key constraints (viz., exhaustion and exclusion): the former rejects
that logic allows ‘gaps’ (i.e., LP maintains that logic demands exhaustion)
but accepts that logic allows ‘gluts’ (i.e., LP rejects that logic imposes exclu-
sion); and the latter rejects that logic allows gluts (i.e., K3 maintains that
logic demands exclusion) but accepts that logic allows gaps (i.e., K3 rejects
that logic imposes exhaustion). The FDE theorist enjoys the more elegant
and symmetric position: namely, that logic demands neither exhaustion nor
exclusion; it demands only the given De Morgan interaction in its vocabu-
lary. And classical logic enjoys an equally elegant and symmetric position as
compared with LP or K3: namely, that logic demands both exhaustion and
exclusion, in addition to the central De Morgan interaction.
1.3 Logic as universal closure
So go the two main candidates for logical consequence (at least for purposes
of this paper). But what, if anything, is special about logical consequence
versus the many other formal closure relations on our true (closed) theories?
On the view assumed herein, logical consequence is the universal – ‘base-
ment level’ – closure relation involved in all of our true (non-empty) theories.
It is the unique formal closure relation involved in all of the extra-logical
closure relations of our many true (hence, non-empty) theories – physics, bi-
ology, algebra, theology, category theory, metaphysics, chemistry, epistemol-
ogy, neuroscience, etc. All such true theories – systematized and expanded as
completely as possible – have closure relations that include, at the bottom-
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level, logical consequence. In this way there’s an obvious sense in which no
true theory transgresses logic: each such theory is closed under logic.
Of course, we can talk about the theory-specific, extra-logical closure
relations of our many theories as ‘the logics of the theories’ if we wish (the
‘logic of sets’, ‘the logic of possibility’, ‘the logic of permissibility’, ‘the logic
of part-whole’ etc.); it does no serious harm whatsoever, and even isolates an
important pattern of inquiry. But if we’re debating whether logic is classical
or nonclassical it behooves us to be clear about the particular closure relation
we are debating. And that’s where Williamson’s new Quinean argument
comes in, and where my discussion is focused.
I do not see this view as conflicting with anything that Williamson says in
his new Quinean argument; but it is definitely a view at stake in his argument.
I repeat that I join Quine and many others – including Williamson in said
paper – in being (to use Williamson’s term) ‘antiexceptionalist’ about logic.
Theories of logical consequence are to be treated as other theories, enjoying
no special epistemic or metaphysical or physical or theological or political
priority over any other theory. This is the dominant view among active
nonclassical-logic theorists, and I endorse it.
Still, such ‘antiexceptionalism’ is perfectly compatible with the target re-
lation’s having an exceptional role in our theories. The exceptional role that
I highlight, for purposes of this discussion, is logic’s basement-level position
in all of the many closure relations involved in our many true theories. On
this view, no true theory has a consequence relation – a closure relation –
that bucks logical consequence; they all conform to the simple De Morgan
demands of the sparse logical vocabulary. But logic is special in that way.
The consequence relations of two theories generally don’t accommodate what
the other demands, largely for the boring reason that the extra-logical vo-
cabulary involved in the (theory-specific) consequence relation is absent from
the other. But logical vocabulary, as Williamson and a very long tradition
attest, is different: it is ‘topic-neutral’ and ‘universal’ in its ubiquity among
all of our systematic true theories.
In what follows, I shall take logic to be as above: the basement-level uni-
versal closure relation involved in all of our true (non-empty) theories, whose
‘forms’ are the usual first-order forms shy of identity. And for simplicity, for
present purposes, there are exactly two candidates: the classical candidate
and the given subclassical candidate (viz., FDE).12
12While I do endorse the given view of logical consequence, I do not believe that these
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2 Williamsonian Quine sans conservatism?
Though the argument is intended to generalize to strange phenomena of any
sort, Quine’s familiar argument against nonclassical logic (a fortiori, against
FDE), as quoted by Williamson [47, p. 340], focuses on paradoxes:
The classical logic of truth functions and quantification is free
of paradox, and incidentally it is a paragon of clarity, elegance,
and efficiency. The paradoxes emerge only with set theory and
semantics. Let us then try to resolve them within set theory and
semantics, and not lay fairer fields to waste [36, p. 85].
Of course, ‘clarity, elegance, and efficiency’ alone don’t go that far. After all,
as Robert K. Meyer emphasized [30], the absolute clearest, most elegant, and
most efficient system (in terms of axioms, rules, and power of output!) is his
‘pure system of irrelevance’, which enjoys a single axiom p and a single rule of
substitution for any sentential variable (including, of course, p). This account
of logical consequence has a beautifully simple description (just given); and
it’s sufficient to deliver every truth expressible in the language of any theory.
But it goes overboard. It delivers the trivial theory – the set of all sentences
of the language of our theory, for any theory we may come up with.
The trivial theory is to be rejected by all lights – be they glut the-
orists, gap theorists, or your run-of-the-mill classical-logic theorist. And
Williamson’s new argument is sensitive to such a broad crowd; it is aimed at
accommodating the FDE account (and explicitly so for extensions thereof).
Where Quine’s argument goes wrong – and this is not obvious from the
quoted bit above – is that Quine’s central premise simply rules out the FDE
account (and nonclassical accounts generally).13 Quine’s central premise is
really twofold:
p1. Classical logic is the status quo, ‘the logic’, as Williamson paraphrases,
that ‘we more or less currently accept’ [47, p. 338].
exhaust the family of the most viable candidates. But my aim here is not to argue for a
particular candidate so much as defend the subclassical family against Williamson’s new
Quinean argument.
13Notoriously, in the same work, Quine goes from Quine-the-Good (viz., a champion of
pragmatism about logical theory) to Quine-the-Bad (viz., one who says that any logical
theory that deviates from the classical one is ‘changing the subject’). Williamson makes
abundantly clear that he is not walking that notorious road; he explicitly aims to accom-
modate the nonclassical theorist – including our running FDE theorist – rather than rule
her out with a conservatism principle against the nonclassical theory.
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p2. Conservatism: hold to the status quo unless there is sufficient payoff in
exchange for ‘change’ (e.g., FDE).
The next premise – which I here bracket out – is that there is not sufficient
payoff, and in fact that there’s significant loss (notably, explanatory loss) in
‘changing’ to FDE (where it really is a change if p1 is correct). Williamson
argues explicitly for this premise by putting forward an objection against
the FDE candidate (and other subclassical candidates); but I address his
objection from explanatory loss in §4, only after addressing his key claim to
improve on Quine by doing without Quine’s conservatism.
Williamson endorses p1 but explicitly rejects p2. I address each in turn,
though the crux of my argument against Williamson’s claim to be free of
Quine’s conservatist premise concerns p2.
2.1 Classical logic as status quo
Is the classical account the status quo in Williamson’s sense – namely, ‘the
logic we more or less currently accept’ [47, p. 338]? Well, the question de-
mands a prior answer: accept as what? For present purposes, the target role
of logic is as the universal closure relation involved in the closure relations of
all of our (non-empty) true theories. I admit that the status quo in intro-logic
classes is something more or less equivalent to classical logic; but it strikes
me as highly controversial whether those (few?) philosophers who’ve compe-
tently reflected on the range of candidates are in agreement about classical
logic’s playing the given universal-closure role. In fact, if anything, the op-
posite may well be right – namely, that the status quo regarding the given
role is different from classical logic. (And I am confident that Williamson
does not intend to invoke the many philosophers who were taught nothing
except classical logic and thereby understandably have no competent grasp
of other candidates.)
Perhaps I am simply mistaken, unable to see the firmly settled conclusions
of a vast majority of the many; but I do not see the mistake. The position
behind p1 demands empirical work, or at least more of an argument than
the claim that classical logic is the status quo (so understood).
Despite the serious reservations about p1 I nonetheless grant the premise
for purposes of Williamson’s new Quinean argument.
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2.2 Strength...sans conservatism?
The problem with Williamson’s argument centers on his would-be replace-
ment for Quinean conservatism. Williamson rightly observes that Quine’s
conservatism simply rules out the FDE theorist – at least granting p1, which
is herein granted. But without conservatism, how does one argue for ‘main-
taining’ – ‘not changing’ – classical logic? Williamson invokes strength.
2.2.1 Strength as Post-completeness
The principal – and clearest – sense of strength that Williamson invokes
is Post-completeness (at least at the propositional level), where this can be
thought of as the very edge of falling into Meyer’s pure calculus of irrelevance.
In particular, classical (propositional) logic is Post-complete in the sense
that if you were to add any other (non-vacuous) axioms (or the effect of
such axioms in the shape of rules) the system would simply be equivalent to
Meyer’s pure calculus of irrelevance, at least in terms of output: namely, it
would take every theory to the trivial theory.
Williamson’s new Quinean argument against FDE replaces conservatism
with strength qua Post-completeness (at least at the propositional fragment).
The problem is that ‘strength’ does not help unless Quine’s conservatism
about ‘keeping classical logic’ is in force – or at least something close to
it. After all, why think that Post-completeness is a virtue of the univer-
sal, basement-level closure relation? The FDE theorist rejects that Post-
completeness is a virtue. Why? Answer: the FDE theorist rightly notes that
Post-completeness precludes not only the (logical) possibility of true glutty
theories but similarly true gappy (prime) theories.14
Williamson might retort that Post-completeness is a virtue of logical con-
sequence (qua given closure relation) if there are no possibly true glutty or
gappy theories of the sort recognized by (the models of) FDE. And that
might be right, of course; but Williamson’s argument – sans Quine’s conser-
vatism – offers no reason to rule out such possibilities, certainly none that
don’t commit Quine’s sin of simply ruling them out from scratch. In this
14A theory is said to be prime iff it contains the logical disjunction of two sentences iff
it contains at least one of the disjuncts. According to classical-logic theorists, many of our
true (and as complete as possible) theories are not prime. (I briefly return to this point in
connection with a looser and secondary sense of ‘strength’ that Williamson’s new Quinean
argument gestures at.)
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way, Williamson’s new Quinean argument does no better than Quine’s origi-
nal argument as far as accommodating its target (and very much live-option)
subclassical candidates.
Williamson [47, p. 337] rightly notes in passing that FDE theorists (and,
generally, other well-known subclassical-logic theorists) reject that Post-
completeness is a virtue of logical consequence (understood as universal clo-
sure, as above). Williamson mentions, without citing, the idea that weakness,
according to some such theorists, is a virtue because weaker-than-classical
logic affords exploration of various theories – glutty ones, gappy ones, mixed
ones, etc.15
Let us suppose that the FDE theorists claims that her account of logic has
the virtue of weakness so understood – namely, that it allows for the explo-
ration of said (nonclassical and nontrivial) theories. Williamson’s argument
against this idea is a slippery slope:
In discussion of alternative logics, it is not always recognized that
strength [Post-completeness] is a strength, in logical theories as
in others. [NB: it is not clear what Williamson means by ‘as in
others’, since he seems to be talking about extra-logical theories
in other non-logical disciplines; but the idea of Post-completeness
doesn’t apply to those in any clear sense. But I set this aside.]
One often encounters various forms of exceptionalism about logic,
according to which weakness is a strength [i.e., virtue] in logic,
because weak logics leave open more possibilities, prejudge fewer
issues, and achieve higher levels of neutrality. However, such
tendencies have no natural stopping-off point short of an empty
consequence relation, since any logical principle whatsoever is in
principle open to challenge. Indeed, virtually every salient logical
principle has actually been challenged by some philosopher or
other. [47, p.337]
Before arresting the (alleged) slippery slope let me set aside Williamson’s
remark about ‘various forms of exceptionalism about logic’. Perhaps there are
logical theorists who are ‘exceptionalists’ in a bad way – and not just in being
clear about the exact role of the relation under discussion. If there are such
15Williamson cites no work in the given remarks, but one such view is advanced by Beall
[9, 10]. Routley [39] also exhibits the spirit of this sort of view, and Meyer and Routley
do too [40].
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theorists, I join Williamson in thinking that their view should be rejected in
favor of the widely dominant Quinean pragmatism. But the ‘exceptionalism’
that Williamson flags (without explaining) need not play any role in whether
Williamson’s slippery-slope argument is viable against our FDE theorist.
The problem with Williamson’s slippery-slope is twofold. First, and most
clearly, even by Williamson’s own lights (which require the standard ‘struc-
tural rules’ of logical consequence), logical consequence must be reflexive in
the standard sense: namely, that A logically entails A, for all A in the lan-
guage of any theory.16 So, the empty consequence relation is ruled out as a
serious candidate right from the get-go. And so the slippery slope is arrested
shy of the would-be empty relation.
Second, and most important, the slippery slope suffers from the defect of
most slippery-slope arguments: it is implausible given our starting point. Re-
call that ‘[i]n discussion of alternative logics’ we agree that debate is pointless
unless we zero in on a particular role for the relation. For present purposes
I have zeroed in on the role of universal closure relation – reflecting the
long tradition of thinking of logic as ‘universal’, ‘topic neutral’, and enjoying
standard closure properties (properties that Williamson implicitly endorses in
his discussion). And there is a starting-point core there beyond the required
closure-relation properties. The FDE theorist – like any subclassical theo-
rist – agrees with the classical theorist that there’s a logical core: namely, De
Morgan behaviour (over the standard stock of connectives). And it’s at this
and only this level of weakness where the FDE theorist claims (we are imag-
ining for the sake of Williamson’s slippery-slope) that there’s a virtue; she
(rightly) says that the given weakness accommodates exploration of impor-
tant (De Morgan-satisfying) glutty and prime gappy theories. Williamson’s
argument suggests that such a theorist must – by parity of reasoning (?) – be
open to even those theories that buck De Morgan behaviour among the stan-
dard connectives, and indeed cannot stop even when one reaches relations
that are no longer closure relations – such as the empty relation.
But why? The supposed weakness-as-virtue claim isn’t – for all that
Williamson’s argument says – that the weaker the universal closure relation
is, the better the universal closure relation is. (If that really is the claim,
then I agree with Williamson that it’s a claim in desperate need of support.
16Since logical consequence is a set-sentence relation, ‘reflexivity’ isn’t exactly the right
term, but we all know what is meant – as reflected in the usual practice of dropping set
notation when dealing with sentence-sentence instances of logical consequence.
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On the surface, it’s palpably implausible. But Williamson fails to cite any
examples.) Presumably, the spirit of Williamson’s ‘strength is a strength’
is not to be read in the same light: namely, that the stronger the universal
closure relation is, the better the universal closure relation is. (That reading
leads to Meyer’s pure calculus of irrelevance, which presumably is ruled out.)
There are limits to the slope, and for present purposes the bottom limit
is De Morgan behaviour. What the FDE theorist advances by saying that
weakness – in this case – is a virtue is that traditional De Morgan behaviour
is respected while allowing for true glutty and gappy theories. There is no
plausible position according to which weakness – in and of itself – is a virtue,
any more than, as above, strength by itself is a strength.
Williamson’s key (or, again, at least clearest) notion of strength is Post-
completeness. But why stop there if strength is a strength? The reason, of
course, is that not anything goes – even if, as Williamson notes, ‘virtually ev-
ery salient logical principle has actually been challenged by some philosopher
or other’. The reason for stopping at Post-completeness is that going beyond
distorts the role at issue: namely, universal closure (respecting traditional De
Morgan). All of this – including the standard closure properties – can and has
been challenged;17 and while all such beyond-closure or beyond-DeMorgan
projects are interesting and fruitful in both mathematical and philosophical
ways, there’s little point in debating alternative logics without taking a firm
stand somewhere.
Just because philosophers have or might question a principle – be it in
logic or any other theory – doesn’t thereby remove the warrant we have in
the principle. That’s what we learned from the pragmatists; that’s what we
learned from Descartes’ unfortunate quest for foundations – valuable as that
episode was in other respects. And the place where Williamson puts his own
stand is a De Morgan closure relation standardly understood, one shy of both
the trivial consequence relation and the anti-trivial one (which wouldn’t even
be a closure relation if we are restricted to non-empty theories). The FDE
theorist puts her stand at the same core: De Morgan interaction. She rightly
notes that the weakness of FDE vis-a-vis the classical-logic account has the
virtue of accommodating possibly true glutty and gappy theories. She does
not claim that weakness is a virtue in and of itself; and that every imaginable
fiction about logic needs to be accommodated.
17Indeed, Rohan French makes a case for dropping reflexivity [21], while a host of others
question variations of transitivity or contraction or more [29, 35, 38, 43, 46, 48].
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I conclude that Williamson’s slippery-slope argument against our can-
didate FDE account fails to land on its mark. This leaves us without an
argument from strength – conceived as Post-completeness – against the FDE
account. Of course, re-invoking Quine’s conservatism premise (viz., both p1
and p2) would change everything; but it would only take us back to Quine’s
original argument which failed to accommodate the FDE theorist as a gen-
uine candidate – something Williamson’s argument (laudably) tried to do.
2.2.2 Strength as increased information?
Williamson does offer another replacement for Quine’s conservatism premise,
one based on a very different – and, alas, much looser – notion of strength.
This is a notion of ‘information strength’ but not the formal one involved in
familiar theories of information strength. Instead, this is an informal notion
illustrated by two theories that are (negation-) inconsistent (i.e., one entails,
by the theory’s closure relation, the logical negation of the other) but one
is ‘stronger’ in the sense of being ‘more specific or informative’ [47, p. 336].
Williamson illustrates:
For instance, ‘The time is between 3.14 and 3.16’ is more specific
than ‘The time is between 4.00 and 12.00’, even though they
are inconsistent with each other.... One role for the informal
scientific standard of strength is to provide a minimal threshold
of informativeness below which theories do not even come up
for serious abductive evaluation. We want scientific theories to
inform us about their subject matters; weak theories do too little
of that to give us what we want. [47, p. 336]
Williamson gives one other illustration (an ‘extreme’ one, he thinks) involving
axiomatized theories in the same language that are jointly logically incon-
sistent – one a conjunction of universals, the other the negations of those
universals – but each theory consistent. The negation-ful theory is less in-
formative in the way that a list of negated universals is less informative than
the unnegated list of universals.
The target notion of strength remains imprecise, and Williamson acknowl-
edges as much.18 The question is whether this imprecise notion helps tilt
18Williamson uses the notion to argue directly for the informal strength (in the run-
ning sense) of a classical-logic-based theory over the intuitionist-logic counterpart. The
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against the FDE theorist, as Williamson suggests that it does. I don’t see
that it does. In fact, it strikes me as tilting against the classical-logic account
towards the FDE (or at least K3) account.
Williamson puts forth his secondary sense of strength to give ‘a minimal
threshold of informativeness below which theories do not even come up for
serious abductive evaluation.’ Notwithstanding missing details, the given
desideratum is a good one. But it also has a flip side. In particular, we
do not want too much informational clutter: we do not want to be dealing
with theories that are about things extraneous to the theory. This is why
primeness of theories is important. We do not want our theory to be talking
at all about q unless our theory takes a stand on q – for example, that q is
true, that q is false. But the classical-logic account of our universal closure
relation demands that our theories have extraneous information: they one
and all talk about whatever q is about for every expressible q in the language,
even if the theory takes no stand on the truth (similarly, falsity) of q. In short,
the classical-logic account, unlike the FDE account, rules out the possibility
of true but negation-incomplete prime theories, and in this way always tows
around an extraneous load of information – one that goes above the maximum
threshold of informativeness.
Williamson might respond that logical truths like instances of excluded
middle are not informative at all, and so do not add informational clutter.
Even so (a matter I grant here only for efficiency), why clutter the theory
with such claims when – for example, in the case of excluded middle (though
it applies across the board) – the theory takes no stand on either disjunct,
and would be more-to-the-point if it were a prime theory? Without a more
precise account of the virtuous levels of information our theories are to take,
Williamson’s secondary sense of strength falls short of tilting against the
FDE account.
argument just mirrors the ‘extreme’ illustration Williamson gives about the axiomatized
theories; but it’s successful only if intuitionists take the sort of stand on propositional
quantification that Williamson suggests. I have no view (at all) on that particular debate,
except to say that it strikes me as implausible that intuitionists should naturally adopt the
approach to propositional quantification that Williamson’s argument assumes. (After all,
propositional quantification often – though not necessarily – aligns with very thin notions
of truth in a way that intuitionist notions of ‘truth as proof’ (to speak crudely) would not.
So, there’s room for intuitionists to balk at Williamson’s invocation of such quantification
in the context. But, again, I leave this aside as an interesting but tangential matter.)
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2.3 Summary evaluation of the new Quinean argument
Quine’s familiar argument against the FDE (and every other nonclassical) ac-
count of logical consequence simply rules out such ‘alternatives’ from scratch;
that’s the effect of Quine’s twofold premise of p1 and p2.
Williamson aims to do better by presenting a new Quinean argument
stripped of Quine’s problematic p2 (and stripped of Quine’s notorious
changing-topic claim). Williamson’s replacement for Quine’s p2 points to
‘strength’ in two different senses, a precise one and an imprecise one. Nei-
ther sense of ‘strength’ serves to give a viable new Quinean argument against
our representative nonclassical account of logic (viz., FDE). The former sense
rules out FDE from scratch – and so commits the same sin as Quine’s original
p2 – or it is left in need of independent support. And the latter (imprecise)
sense of ‘strength’ is backed only by a slippery-slope argument that fails on
at least two (discussed) fronts.
I conclude that Williamson’s new Quinean argument against nonclassical
logic fails.19
3 The supplemental severe-testing argument
Of his new Quinean argument, which I have argued fails to undermine an
FDE (or similar subclassical) accounts of logic, Williamson notes that it can
be strengthened by the ‘track record of classical logic’:
The strong prima facie abductive case for classical logic just
noted [i.e., from strength] does not depend on a principle of con-
servatism. It does not rely on the position of classical logic as the
status quo, the logic we more or less currently accept, nor does
it appeal to the benefits of familiarity or the costs of change.
19Gillian Russell [41] argues that neither sense of ‘strength’ is a virtue or a vice of a
logical theory – and hence neither a virtue of the classical-logic account nor a vice of the
FDE account, and similarly is neither a vice of the classical-logic account nor a virtue of
the FDE account. If Russell is correct at least about the non-strength conclusion then
all the worse for Williamson’s new Quinean argument. Of course, if she’s also correct
about the non-vice conclusion then all the worse for those – including this author – who
think that FDE’s weakness (where it stands) is a virtue. I am not convinced that Rus-
sell’s conclusions are correct but for present purposes I bracket them only to show that
Williamson’s argument does not refute the nonclassical accounts any more than Quine’s
notorious argument does.
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It concerns intrinsic features of classical logic, such as simplicity
and strength, which it would have even if we currently accepted
some non-classical logic [such as FDE]. The case may indeed be
strengthed by reference to the track record of classical logic: it
has been tested far more severely than any other logic in the his-
tory of science, most notably in the history of mathematics, and
has withstood the tests remarkably well. Nevertheless, the initial
abductive case for classical logic would be quite powerful, even if
we had only stumbled across that logic a few weeks ago.
Williamson doesn’t elaborate on the ‘severe testing’ that classical logic has
undergone; but the idea, I assume, is that many of our true theories appear
to be closed under classical logic – that is, the logical vocabulary appears to
behave precisely as classical logic predicts.
For the sake of debate (but, in truth, also for the sake of truth) let me
grant that many of our true theories are just so: they appear to be closed
under classical logic. Is this a problem for our representative nonclassical
account (viz., FDE)? Details are ultimately needed for a final answer. Still,
even in general, I agree that Williamson’s severe-testing argument does im-
pose a prima facie challenge to the FDE theorist. In particular, the FDE
theorist needs to explain how, despite the weakness of logic itself (demanding
no more nor less than familiar De Morgan interaction over its connectives),
many of our true theories appear to be closed under classical logic – and not
just thereby closed under FDE.20 The prima facie challenge is to explain such
appearances.
How does the FDE theorist explain the ubiquity of true theories that are
apparently closed under classical logic? The answer, not surprisingly, points
to the theories themselves, and in particular the extra-logical consequence
relations of those theories.21 Logic (-al consequence) is the universal clo-
sure relation on our true (non-empty) theories. But the construction (or, if
20If a non-empty theory is closed under classical logic then it’s thereby closed under
every subclassical logic.
21Williamson takes up this idea in a different objection from ‘explanatory loss’ (see §4),
though not in relation to the current severe-testing argument. Unfortunately, Williamson
doesn’t cite any theorists who actually address these concerns, but presumably he has
in mind the likes of Beall [5, 7, 8] and possibly very passing remarks by Humberstone
[26]. These are concrete examples of nonclassical theorists addressing the severe-testing
argument, but of course the idea is common through most work on subclassical-logic
accounts.
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you prefer, discovery) of such theories requires construction (or discovery) of
extra-logical closure relations that are specific to the theory. Obvious exam-
ples: logic (qua universal and topic-neutral closure relation) is silent on all
but its vocabulary, and hence silent on the special theory-specific vocabulary
of arithmetic, epistemology, etc. Logic doesn’t say anything about whether,
for example, it is known that P entails P . That’s a matter for theories
of knowledge. And so on. Moreover, logic, according to the FDE account,
doesn’t tell you whether an arbitrary contradiction !A (shorthand for A∧¬A)
entails every sentence B, or dually whether ¡A (shorthand for A∨¬A) is en-
tailed by every sentence B. That, on the FDE account, is a theory-specific
matter; logic itself – qua topic-neutral, universal closure relation – demands
only the core De Morgan behaviour.
Are there common ways of constructing the given extra-logical closure
relations that result in the effect of classical-logic closure? Yes. Details
depend on the subclassical account, but a very simple one invokes ‘shriek’
and ‘shrug’ rules.22
To shriek a predicate P in a theory is to impose the following condition
on the theory’s consequence relation:23
∃x(Px ∧ ¬Px) `T ⊥
where ⊥ is some sentence in the language of T which, according to the
theory’s closure relation `T , entails all sentences in the language of T . The
effect of shrieking P is to reduce the theory’s models in such a way as to
ignore the many glutty models that logic itself otherwise allows. If one shrieks
all predicates in the language of theory one thereby reduces the models of
the theory to non-glutty ones – and, hence, one thereby has the theoretical
impossibility of gluts. A theory is shrieked (simpliciter) if all of its predicates
are shrieked.
To shrug a predicate P in a theory is to impose the dual of shrieking:24
> `T ∀x(Px ∨ ¬Px)
22These ideas are aired by Belnap & Dunn [16], aired against by Priest [33], but refined
and advanced by Beall [5, 6, 9].
23The ‘shriek’ terminology just follows the common abbreviation ‘!A’ for ‘A ∧ ¬A’,
where ‘!’ is often called ‘shriek’. (Others call it ‘bang’, as Roy Sorensen and Gill Russell
independently reminded me.)
24The terminology ‘shrug’ is from Colin McCullough-Benner, who likened excluded mid-
dle as a sort of shrug of the shoulders while saying that ‘it’s at least one of either true and
false (but that’s all I’m committed to as far as the theory’s possibilities/models go)’.
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where > is some sentence in the language of T which, according to the
theory’s closure relation `T , is entailed by all sentences in the language of
T . The effect of shrugging P is to reduce the theory’s models in such a way
as to ignore the many gappy models that logic itself otherwise allows. If
one shrugs all predicates in the language of a theory one thereby reduces the
models of the theory to non-gappy ones – and, hence, one thereby has the
theoretical impossibility of gaps. A theory is shrugged (simpliciter) if all of
its predicates are shrugged.
How, then, does the FDE (or similar subclassical) theorist explain the
ubiquity of true theories that are apparently closed under classical logic?
She points to the ubiquity of shrieking and shrugging. Such classical-logic
behaviour is (as Williamson’s challenge notes) ‘most notabl[e] in the history
of mathematics’. Indeed, it is precisely in mathematical theories wherein the
theoretical possibilities – those possibilities modeled by the given theory’s
models – are always reduced to classical models. All of this is perfectly in
line with the idea that logical consequence – qua the universal (topic-neutral)
closure relation – is subclassical.25
Much more can be said by way of the FDE theorist’s response to
Williamson’s severe-testing argument; but I hope that enough has been said
to show that the ‘track record of classical logic’ in mathematics (and other
disciplines) not only can be naturally explained by the FDE account; it al-
ready has been explained in various concrete accounts.
4 Williamson’s objection from explanatory loss
Even though Williamson’s new Quinean argument does not fly without re-
sorting to Quine’s conservatism (or something similar), Williamson advances
a direct objection intended to undermine the FDE account, the objection
from explanatory loss.26 While part of a specific discussion of responding to
25Let me emphasize that not all subclassical-logic (certainly not all nonclassical-logic)
accounts maintain this ‘classical’ line about mathematics. (Perhaps the most prominent
glut theorist, viz., Graham Priest, does not endorse it.) But it is in no way a minority
view, or even close to a minority view. By my lights, it’s a very common view among
recent subclassical-logic theorists.
26I should note that Williamson, in the closing paragraph of [47], takes his various
objections to (by implication) FDE to have been neglected by those of us working on
paradoxes. This is a very curious claim to make given that much of the work has taken
precisely some of Williamson’s considerations to be drivers of their various accounts. This
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:7) 2019, Article no. 2
223
truth-theoretic paradox, the crux of the broader explanatory-loss objection
against nonclassical account of logic is this:27
[R]estricting classical logic will tend to impose widespread restric-
tions on its explanatory power, by blocking the derivation of its
classical consequences in particular applications. [47, p. 340]
The objection is closely related to the severe-testing argument (see §3) and
the FDE theorist’s shrieking-shrugging response. As above, the FDE ac-
count (or similar subclassical accounts) says that classical logic does not
have the explanatory power that Williamson assumes (partly in his assump-
tion of Quine’s p1); the explanatory power of our (in-effect) classically closed
true theories is via a restriction to classical models for the theories – just as
Williamson believes. The derivation of such classical consequences is as it
always appears: namely, that arbitrary B follows from arbitrary !A in the
theory; that A ∧ (A → B), where → is logic’s material conditional defined
as usual (viz., ¬A ∨ B), has B as a consequence; and that arbitrary ¡A is
a consequence of arbitrary B; and so on. This is all in keeping with the
FDE account; it’s just that the given classical consequences are in fact extra-
logical consequences fueled by the theory-specific investigation – for which,
we may assume, the theorist has no good reason to give up methodologi-
cal principles of ‘exhaustion’ and ‘exclusion’ for the theories, especially in
the severely tested branches of standard mathematics and its many, many
successful applications in science.
Williamson’s explanatory-loss objection is in fact partly in response to
just such shrieking/shrugging accounts.28 He puts the more general worry as
follows, where I replace his talk of K3 with the more general example FDE.
is true of recent salient work on truth-theoretic paradoxes [4, 20, 33] – in parts, very
explicitly so. But I hope that the brief replies I give to Williamson’s various particular
objections are representative of the longstanding responses.
27I should note that I agree with much of what Williamson says about the unimportance
of having a fully transparent truth predicate in many of our true scientific theories, where
a transparent truth predicate is one for which full intersubstitutability is validated by the
theory’s closure relation [4, 20]. Of course, if we do have true theories with their own
transparent truth predicate – a device whose sole job is to be transparent just so – then
the ‘choice’ between an in-effect classically closed theory and an FDE-closed theory is easy.
(The former is trivial; the latter needn’t be.) But Williamson’s arguments are intended,
for all I can see, to be of broader significance against nonclassical accounts of logic, and
so I leave talk of various truth predicates to the side.
28Williamson cites Field [20], which in one sense does provide an example of subclassical
shrieking, but Field’s account – like those of Beall [4] and Priest [33] – unfortunately
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There is a more general concern. The retreat to [FDE] inval-
idates vast swathes of ordinary mathematical reasoning, since
mathematicians freely reason in ways that depend on the law
of excluded middle. The natural scientists might overcome the
restrictions [of FDE] by postulating instances of excluded middle
[similarly, shriek rules] as needed. But then their explanations
invoke those auxiliary [i.e., extra-logical] assumptions, which re-
duces their explanatory value; elegant explanations get as much
as possible out of as little as possible.... [T]he point is that the
auxiliary assumptions are ad hoc for the Kleenean in a way they
are not for the classical logician, who derives them all from the
simple, elegant, general principles of classical logic.
How does the FDE account of logical consequence reply?
I note first, but only to set it aside, that presumably Williamson’s talk of
‘reasoning’ is supposed to be borne out in the ubiquity of classically closed
mathematical theories, where the closure relation mirrors classical conse-
quence. Williamson isn’t really talking about the correct theory of reason-
ing – for example, ‘change in view’ or acceptance-rejection behaviour – in
any serious sense [23, 24]. After all, if that were the target notion of logical
consequence then we would not be talking about consequence as a closure
(and, hence, monotonic!) relation; it would be, as the terminology goes,
‘non-monotonic logic’ through and through. Instead, such talk of the math-
ematician postulating excluded middle (or its dual) and her ‘free reasoning’
with such postulates is to be taken as talk of mathematical theories – which,
I’ve agreed, are in effect classically closed.
The crux of the objection rests on the claim that the ‘auxiliary assump-
tions’ – that is, the FDE theorist’s shriek/shrug rules – reduce the ‘explana-
tory value’ of those rules. Why is this? Williamson is clear in his answer:
complicates things with a quest for Curry-suitable conditionals, thereby turning the whole
account into something well beyond the elegant FDE account sketched here. Moreover,
Williamson invokes Halbach [22], who points out that arithmetical theories in which there
is transparent truth and the basement-level closure relation is only K3 are ones that
are notably weaker than standard classical-logic-based theories with respect to transfinite
induction. This is an issue if one thinks that arithmetic needs to have transparent truth,
but I agree with Williamson that such a view of arithmetic – or even other theories in
mathematics – is not obviously correct. In any event, the explanatory power on which
Williamson’s argument rests assumes that our true mathematical theories are classical,
and so I assume with him that they don’t have a transparent truth predicate – which is
why we are setting those issues aside.
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namely, that ‘elegant explanations get as much as possible out of as lit-
tle as possible.’ But how is this supposed to count against the shriek and
shrug rules? It’s true that such rules are implicit in the classical-logic ac-
count of the basement-level closure relation, and not implicit in the FDE
account. But how does this reduce their explanatory power? Williamson
clarifies: ‘they’re ad hoc for the [FDE theorist] in a way they are not for
the [classical-logic theorist], who derives them all from the simple, elegant,
general principles of classical logic.’ And so, according to Williamson, the
problem with shriek/shrug rules is that they’re ad hoc and in that respect
(alone) not as explanatory as they’d be if they were implicit in all theories.
By way of reply it’s worth repeating that the FDE account does, as
Williamson says, treat shriek/shrug rules as ‘ad hoc’ in the sense of being
extra-logical and theory-specific. In the same way, the physicist’s postulation
of spin is ad hoc and extra-logical; the principles governing such a property
are specific to the theories involving it. (And so on, for all of our interesting
theories.) So, it’s not simply the theory-specific ingredients of a theory’s
extra-logical closure relation that raises the (alleged) explanatory-loss prob-
lem. So, what is it?
Williamson points to the fact that the other candidate (namely, the
classical-logic candidate) can derive the given shriek/shrug rules in all theo-
ries, and so doesn’t need them to be explicitly added. (That’s just what it is
to be logical consequence: the given entailment behaviour for the given con-
nectives is exhibited in all of our true theories. Hence, neither the FDE nor
the classical-logic candidate needs to explicitly add De Morgan behaviour.)
And that’s right. But that alone – the ability to derive from ‘simple, elegant
general principles’ – is not a virtue in itself. After all, once again, Meyer’s
pure calculus of irrelevance wins hands down on that criterion.
Meyer’s pure calculus of irrelevance shouldn’t be praised for its ability to
elegantly and very simply derive shriek/shrug rules across all theories. Why?
Answer: because it clutters the theories with irrelevant untruths. And what
we care about are truths – relevant or not. According to the FDE theorist
there can be true glutty theories and true (prime) gappy theories. It may
well be (in fact, usually is) that there’s a methodological stance according
to which such possibilities should be ruled out by our theories unless there’s
special reason to take them seriously.29 Of course, if it turns out that at
29This may be the case with strange phenomena like the liar, which screams out for
a glutty treatment – ‘I am not true’ ! Logic, according to FDE theorists, doesn’t force
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the ‘end of inquiry’ (so to speak) every single true theory of every single
phenomenon is classically closed via shriek/shrug rules, then Williamson’s
point about a simpler account is spot on – no question about it. In that
case, there’d be no point in dwelling on the remote ‘possibilities’ of gluts
and gaps – ruled out as theoretically impossible by every single true theory –
and in that respect a more beautiful account of logic would simply be the
classical-logic account. But that’s a far cry from where we sit, where the
FDE account and classical-logic account are both taken to be live options.
In the end, Williamson’s explanatory-loss argument against the FDE ac-
count either rules out the account from the start or is ineffective as an ob-
jection to it.30
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